Republican party. As the events of the 1980s showed, the old class in America was alive and well; it survived and flourished in the decades after Gouldner's prophecy. In particular, it found a powerful voice within the New Right and the rejuvenated Republican party, which gutted what was left of the welfare state and launched an all-out attack on the educated liberal morality of the intellectuals.
Gouldner's imagined synthesis of techne and morality was therefore a fantasy, and the problem with it was that it came at the end, rather than the beginning, of an era. It had been the central fantasy of the United States professional class, which had been governed by it since the late nineteenth century. It was the ideal that had propelled most of the political movements dominated by professionals, from early-twentieth-century Progressivism to the New Deal to the Great Society. And it was the ideal of the modern research university, which divided the new class into specialized professions yet also promised to bind them together according to common social ends. Steven Brint, in a more recent history of United States professionalism, describes this ideal as the "social-trustee" ideology of early professionals: "Technically, it promised competent performance of skilled work involving the application of broad and complex knowledge, the acquisition of which required formal academic study. Morally, it promised to be guided by an appreciation of the important social ends it served" (7). The ultimate goal of this ideology was to replace the capital-owning bourgeoisie with a new elite distinguished by its technical accomplishments and its moral desire to reform society for the benefit of all.
The problem, however, is that the logic of specialization, instead of binding together the new class, atomized it into a concatenation of disciplines. As John Ehrenreich and Barbara Ehrenreich argue, "specialization was the PMC [professional-managerial class] member's chief selling point, the quality which justified his or her claim to a unique niche in society, but it acted as a centrifugal force on the class as a whole" (27) . In particular, according to both Brint and the Ehrenreichs, professionalization drove a wedge between the two factions of the new class identified by Gouldner-the humanist intellectuals and the technical intelligentsia. The humanists increasingly took over the moral claims of professionalism, generally combined with a distrust of technical accomplishment. The technical professionals, meanwhile, cultivated techne for its own sake, often unmoored from moral considerations. The university, instead of becoming the site of techne and morality's reconciliation, became the site of their disconnection.
Recently, this new class theory account of a split in social-trustee professionalism has been taken up by several sociologically minded literary critics, who have tried to account for the evolution of their discipline since the end of World War II in these terms.1 John Guillory, for instance, has repeatedly drawn attention to the disciplinary consequences of literary studies' marginal position in the academy, especially in relation to the disciplines favored by the technical intelligentsia. In a recent article on the Sokal hoax,2 he tries to show how antiscientific skepticism (usually linked to some sort of emancipatory politics) has become the "spontaneous philosophy" of literary criticism, an unargued ideology that emerges in moments when the discipline has to defend itself against outsiders. Literary critics, in other words, typically conceive of their discipline as the moral and antitechnical profession par excellence. In Guillory's account, this spontaneous philosophy emerged in the 1940s through the 1960s, the period of massive university expansion in the United States. It originated in literary criticism's efforts to define a place for itself within the academy in opposition to the social sciences and in particular sociology, the disciplines that most clearly embodied the threatened intrusion of the technical intelligentsia into humanistic territory. This definition by exclusion was mutual; literary criticism claimed interpretation as its exclusive methodological principle and viewed positivist knowledge with suspicion, while the social sciences did just the opposite: "First, the social sciences were led to discard interpretation as much as possible from their methodological repertoire. And, second, the humanities came to be identified as the disciplines whose only method was interpretation" (498).3 In sociology and literary studies in the United States, the paradigms that instituted this transformation were the structural functionalism of Talcott Parsons and the New Criticism of John Crowe Ransom, Cleanth Brooks, Allen Tate, Robert Penn Warren, and others. Parsons's sociology represented the apogee of his discipline's technocratic ambitions. He pushed sociology away from the interpretive tendencies of earlier paradigms such as the Chicago school and tried to refashion it as an objective science. The New Criticism, meanwhile, marked the turning point when academic literary studies became antiscientific. The New Critics viewed literature as the only remaining moral counterweight to the triumph of technical rationality, and they therefore tried to purge all social scientific techniques and claims from literary interpretation. Under the guidance of structural functionalism and the New Criticism, sociology and literary studies thus became professionalized in seemingly opposite ways; they became attracted to opposite poles of social-trustee professionalism.
I propose to draw a more complicated picture of the separation of sociology and literary studies that took place under the aegis of structural functionalism and the New Criticism after World War II. The separation of these disciplines was not simply a divorce between techne and morality but involved a disciplinary dialectic, whereby each discipline sought to recuperate both the moral and technical claims of social-trustee professionalism, albeit in irreconcilable ways. Parsons's structural functionalism did indeed try to push sociology closer to the natural sciences by excluding interpretation and by inventing a new technical vocabulary for the discipline. However, at the heart of his Byzantine theoretical edifice was the notion that social systems are held together by nonrational moral values that once originated from the pulpit but today come from the universities. The purpose of sociologists and other welfare-state professionals is to maintain and reproduce these values, which ensure the homeostasis of the social system. Hence, Parsons's conception of the sociologist's function was essentially humanistic and cleaved to the lineaments of social-trustee ideology. Similarly, the New Criticism was rooted in an overt hostility toward the technocratic tendencies of the sciences and social sciences. However, the effect of the New Critics' work was to reshape literary studies in imitation of these disciplines; the method of close reading, as John Crowe Ransom argued in "Criticism, Inc." (1937 [Selected Essays 93-106] ), was supposed to make criticism more scientific-that is, more predictable and rigorous. Close reading became the discipline's specialized techne, its claim to professional identity, and the New Critics linked this techne to the imagined moral effects of literature in modern society.
The ideal of the university, in other words, was to generate a synthesis of morality and specialized techne, forging a meritocratic professional class that could displace the old bourgeoisie as society's intelligent and moral elite. However, in sociology and literature, the process of specialization meant that this synthesis took place in isolation within each discipline. The result was two distinct disciplinary fantasies; sociology and literature each imagined itself as a self-sufficient new class unto itself, one that played a central role in generating the moral unity of modern society. Structural functionalism and the New Criticism therefore exemplify the extent to which social-trustee professionalism was often a fractured ideology. It responded within the two disciplines to the same institutional pressures but shaped each one as an autonomous field.
The United States as University
The differentiation of sociology and literary studies that began in the mid-1930s is particularly striking given that the two disciplines often overlapped in the United States in the early decades of the twentieth century. Before the emergence of the New Criticism and functional sociology, many sociologists incorporated the methods and assumptions of novelists into their work and vice versa. In particular, as Carla Cappetti argues in Writing Chicago, a rich cross-fertilization of sociology and literature took place in Chicago in the 1920s and 1930s. The dominant sociological paradigm in the United States at this time was the Chicago School of Sociology, generally remembered for its empirical studies of Chicago's ethnic neighborhoods and subcultures. This school relied on qualitative methods, especially ethnographic techniques borrowed from the Boasian tradition in anthropology. According to Cappetti, the Chicago school also borrowed from latenineteenth-and early-twentieth-century literary naturalism-especially the work of urban writers such as Émile Zola and Theodore Dreiser; this debt was particularly evident in the sociologists' style, which relied on rich description to convey a phenomenal sense of Chicago's communities. The Chicago sociologists in turn influenced the generation of naturalists that emerged in the 1930s-James Farrell, Nelson Algren, and Richard Wright. By the late 1930s, in Cappetti's account, Chicago sociology and literary naturalism were converging toward a common writing practice: "on the one hand the tendency toward a more subjective sociology, a sociology that rediscovered the subjectivity of the individual as a social and cultural being; on the other the tendency toward a more objective literature, a literature that rediscovered the individual's unbreachable ties with the larger cultural and social spheres" (199) .4
In the mid-1930s, a disciplinary backlash set in against the Chicago school. In part, this rejection was regional. Eastern sociologists chafed against the midwestern command of their field: Chicago sociologists at this time dominated both the discipline's major professional association (the American Sociological Society, later renamed the American Sociological Association) and its premier journal (the American Sociological Review). However, the backlash was primarily against the ostensibly unprofessional tendencies of the Chicago school; their sociology seemed too qualitative, too amateurish, and too unscientific. These deficiencies were particularly galling, since sociology seemed poised on the brink of becoming a discipline that would be centrally involved in government administration and industrial management; the reaction against the Chicago school roughly coincided with the rise of industrial sociology and the increased use of social scientists in the New Deal.5 In the place of the Chicago school, Talcott Parsons gradually emerged as the discipline's major theorist. By the 1950s, a plurality of sociologists worked within a structural functionalist framework derived from Parsons's second major book, The Social System (1951), and from articles written by students such as Robert Merton.6 Parsons exemplified the desire of sociologists to establish their discipline on a firmer methodological footing by purging from it the literary influences of the Chicago school. This ambition was announced in his first book, The Structure of Social Action (1937) , an attempt to create a grand synthesis of preexisting sociological theory through detailed readings of Alfred Marshall, Vilfredo Pareto, Émile Durkheim, and Max Weber. The program announced by the book was the antithesis of everything represented by the Chicago school. The Chicago school sociologists focused on qualitative investigation, sometimes to the detriment of theory. Perhaps because of the influence of Chicago pragmatists such as John Dewey and George Herbert Mead, they treated sociological concepts as tools to be picked up or discarded, depending on the tool's utility for a given project. This pragmatic attitude toward theory can be seen in Robert Park and Ernest Burgess's Introduction to the Science of Sociology (1921) , which was supposed to be the school's basic theoretical text. In fact, it was a compendium of lengthy excerpts from other nineteenth-and early-twentieth-century social theorists, tied together by the two editors' introductions and conclusions to each chapter.
Parsons's goal, in contrast, was to reemphasize the priority of general theory in sociology. For Parsons, the problem with American sociology was that it was no more than a series of discrete analyses, devoid of any theoretical framework or consistent methodology. Sociology, in the hands of the Chicago school, had degenerated into an unprofessional and prescientific exercise in observing and recording the social world. Parsons described his alternative methodological position as one of "analytical realism." As opposed to the qualitative empiricism of the Chicago school, Parsons argued that theory should come first:
[S]cientific "theory"-most generally defined as a body of logically interrelated "general concepts" of empirical reference-is not only a dependent but an independent variable in the development of science. It goes without saying that a theory to be sound must fit the facts but it does not follow that the facts alone, discovered independently of theory, determine what the theory is to be, nor that theory is not a factor in determining what facts will be discovered, what is to be the direction of interest of scientific investigation.
For this reason, Parsons's work operated at a greater level of abstraction than that of any previous sociologist; in book after book, he developed an ever-more-elaborate conceptual apparatus intended to categorize and systematize all possible sociological knowledge. Even more important in terms of its effect on his discipline, Parsons reinvented the language of sociology. Most members of the Chicago school had written in a nontechnical style, enriched with lengthy quotations from subjects and evocations of Chicago neighborhoods. This style had been a virtual necessity given the Chicago sociologists' use of participantobservation methods, and it was one of the aspects of their work that so appealed to 1930s naturalists such as Farrell and Wright. Parsons, in contrast, invented a convoluted, technical vocabulary, which many of his students referred to as Parsonese. It was a style intended to give the reader a sense of the abstract, technical level at which Parsons's sociology functioned. It was distinctly unliterary, and it made few concessions to the lay reader. C. Wright Mills, in The Sociological Imagination (1959) , cited the following passage from The Social System to reveal the stylistic depths to which his discipline had sunk under Parsons:
A role then is a sector of the total orientation system of an individual actor which is organized about expectations in relation to a particular interaction context, that is integrated with a particular set of value-standards which govern interaction with one or more alters in the appropriate complementary roles. These alters need not be a defined group of individuals, but can involve any alter if and when he comes into a particular complementary interaction relationship with ego which involves a reciprocity of expectations with reference to common standards of value-orientation.
(39)7
This style privileged conceptual difficulty for its own sake, and it lent a veneer of professional and scientific dignity to a discipline struggling to defend its position in relation to the other social sciences. However, if Parsons wanted to professionalize his discipline by liberating it from the literary tendencies of the Chicago school, he also, in a different way, wanted to claim for his discipline the moral concerns typically associated with the humanities. Beginning with The Structure of Social Action, he initiated a running polemic against sociological positivism and mechanistic thinking. " [Herbert] Spencer is dead," Parsons announced in his introduction (3); it is no longer possible to conceive of human behavior in purely deterministic terms, as if human beings were machines or brute animals. Parsons emphasized instead the role of nonrational values and customs, which he believed ensure the cohesion of all societies. Hence, the central effort of The Structure of Social Action was to show that his four theorists-Marshall, Pareto, Durkheim, and Weber-were converging toward a common social action theory that conceived of social behavior as fundamentally nonrational. In his later social systems theory or structural functionalism, which departed from his early action theory in important ways, Parsons maintained this emphasis on the determining role of nonrational values. At the heart of his later theory, with its systems within systems within systems, was the idea that every society has a central cultural system, consisting of that society's values and traditions. The purpose of a modern society's social institutions (schools, hospitals, courts of law, etc.), is to integrate these nonrational values into the psyche of every individual and to therapeutically recondition anyone who goes astray. This process ensures the equilibrium or homeostasis of the social system-two of the key terms of Parsons's critical vocabulary.
Hence, at the center of Parsons's work was a social-trustee fantasy about the moral function of professionals and professional institutions in United States society, and this fantasy managed to be at once humanistic and technocratic. Professionals, for him, are the chief agents of socialization in United States society; they are secular priests. Gouldner, commenting in The Future of Intellectuals on this aspect of Parsons's work, thus notes that "Talcott Parsons's vast oeuvre can best be understood as a complex ideology of the New Class, expressed by and through his flattering conception of professionalism" (37).8 In fact, Parsons had two flattering concepts or fantasies of professionalism. The first, which he worked through in The Social System, focused on professionals' role as cultivators of public morality. The second, which appeared intermittently throughout his writings, focused on the social structure of the professions, which he believed would soon transform United States society into the best of all possible social systems. In particular, Parsons conceived of "professionalism" as a mediating term between two of the central concepts of sociological theory-Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. Gemeinschaft, or traditional community, is collectivist and immediate, bound together by face-to-face contacts. Gesellschaft, or modern society, is individualistic and abstract, bound by contractual relations and therefore prone to anomie. For Parsons, the professions combine the best elements of both. In Parsons's terms, they are societal communities, organic villages of professionals sprouting up within the impersonal, bureaucratic state. Parsons's preeminent example of this type of association is the academic department:
[T]he collegial pattern is today perhaps most fully institutionalized in the academic world, which contrary to what many have argued, is not giving way to bureaucratization, even though higher education has recently undergone unprecedented expansion. The basic equality of "colleagues" in a faculty or department is in particularly sharp and persistent contrast with bureaucratic hierarchy.
According to Parsons, this type of organization is spreading throughout the United States as more citizens receive a higher education and flood the marketplace. Academia stands at the center of what Parsons called an educational revolution, akin to the industrial and democratic revolutions of previous centuries. This revolution will transform the United States into a massive societal community of free professionals. Even in business, "organizations have become more associational, for it is essential to secure the cooperation of specialists without asserting sheer authority. Much of modern 'bureaucracy' thus verges on the collegial pattern" (System of Modern Societies 105). Parsons thus imagined that the technical intelligentsia, trained by social-trustee professionals in the academy, would reform both government and the modern corporation in its image. America, for Parsons, is becoming a university. Parsons's sociology, then, eschewed the literary methodology and discursive style of the Chicago school, which it treated as a disciplinary "outside" that threatened its professional identity; the discipline's essential techne had to be kept pure of anything that seemed like an amateurish import from a humanistic discipline. At the same time, Parsons recuperated many of the concerns of literary intellectuals and other humanists by claiming nonrational moral consensus as the central object of sociological study. This social-trustee synthesis of antiliterary techne and humanistic morality was crucial to Parsons's conception of the role of sociologists and other professionals in the welfare state, and it explained the basic conservatism and fantasy element of his position. Parsons's sociology, justifiably attacked as a typical example of "establishment thinking" by New Left sociologists of the late 1960s, was in fact rooted in liberal ideals. He hoped for a greater distribution of educational advantages, greater inclusion of African Americans in the United States "societal community," a concerted professional effort to eliminate poverty, and so forth. The problem with these social ideals was that they were rarely coupled with any pragmatic program for their implementation; he assumed his ideals were already embodied in the practice of professionalism and need only await the progress of time to spread throughout the rest of society. Professionals, in other words, are not active reformers; by safeguarding and reproducing their society's already existing central values, they ensure the continuity and homeostasis of the social system. However, what is most striking about Parsons's work is the extent to which his social-trustee ideal contradicted the actual effects his work had on his discipline. According to Parsons's notion of professionalism, society's central moral values radiate out from the professions to the rest of the social system, but the effect of Parsons's work was to help transform sociology into an insular discipline, disconnected from public discourse. This effect stemmed directly from his methodological rejection of sociology's literary tendencies-in particular, the Chicago school's readable, nontechnical style. Ironically, the sociologists of the 1950s and 1960s who best fulfilled Parsons's social-trustee ambitions were those who most vehemently rejected his methods-maverick sociologists who cultivated an accessible style and wrote for a nondisciplinary audience, such as Mills.
From the Old South to the Academy of Letters
While most American sociologists after the mid-1930s were trying to distance themselves from the literary-minded Chicago school, American literary critics were involved in a dialectical interplay with their own disciplinary other-the social sciences. This was particularly true of the New Critics, who responded to the same pressures of professionalization as Parsons and created a disciplinary synthesis of techne and morality that became a potent force in the post-World War II academy. For sociology in the United States, the eschewal of literary methods marked the changing of the guard between the University of Chicago and Harvard. With the New Critics, the influence of disciplinary specialization is directly traceable in the dramatic alteration of their theory over the course of the 1930s and 1940s.
In the early 1930s, most of the New Critics were political Agrarians chiefly interested in protecting the South from industrialism; by the 1940s, they were formalist aesthetes interested in disseminating the apolitical practice of close reading throughout the academy.
This transition has been the focus of several studies of New Critical professionalization-in particular, Guillory's Cultural Capital and Gerald Graff's Professing Literature. Both studies highlight the essential continuity between the Agrarians' early political ideals and New Critical formalism; hence, Graff argues that "New Critics like Ransom did not think they were turning their backs on the moral and social function of literature. For them, rather, the point was to define these social and moral functions as they operated within the internal structure of literary works themselves" (148). Similarly, Guillory shows how the Agrarians' interest in social doxa-in a preconscious commonality of belief that the Agrarians believed was embodied in traditional communities-became translated into their later formalist criticism as an essential quality of literature. Graff 's and Guillory's identification of this larger continuity underlying Agrarianism and New Critical professionalism provides a useful corrective to most accounts of the New Critics' depoliticization.9 However, it overlooks an important discontinuity in the Agrarians' and New Critics' relation to disciplinary specialization, exemplified by their changing attitudes toward the sciences and social sciences. Both the Agrarians and the New Critics engaged in frequent polemics against the sciences and social sciences, which they viewed as harbingers of atheist rationalism and technocratic industrialism. However, the Agrarians viewed these technical professions as cultural, rather than disciplinary, threats. Resisting them meant becoming aware of one's identity as a southerner; it entailed no particular vigilance toward one's own disciplinary practices. Indeed, many of the Agrarians' early essays exemplified the same intermingling of disciplinary practices that the Chicago school engaged in. Much of this work was not literary criticism at all but amateur sociology; it dabbled in economics, anthropology, and history to theorize the difference between rural communities and industrial society. This sociological bent changed with the emergence of New Critical professionalism. Increasingly the New Critics saw the academy, rather than the region, as the critic's primary object of identification; in Antonio Gramsci's terms, they came to imagine themselves as an independent class of traditional intellectuals rather than as organic intellectuals intimately connected to the South. It was now the discipline that needed to be defended from outsiders, and this could only occur through a process of professionalization-namely, by inventing and disseminating specialized reading techniques that could compete with the technical disciplines. The New Critics thus came to imagine themselves as dissident members of the new class they had once shunned-as members with a special access to aesthetic sensibility and moral values unavailable to the other disciplines. This changed awareness seeped into their work over the course of the 1930s-in particular into the work of Ransom, the American New Critics' mentor and chief theorist.
Agrarianism, from the beginning, was a movement of traditional intellectuals; most of the writers and critics associated with it never strayed far from the academy. It got its start at Vanderbilt University in the early 1920s, when Cleanth Brooks, Robert Penn Warren, and Allen Tate were undergraduate students of Ransom. With the exception of Brooks, they were members of a campus-based poetry group called the Fugitives, part of the southern literary renaissance.10 These poet-critics turned from literature to conservative cultural criticism in the mid-1920s, inspired in part by the "Scopes monkey trial" of 1925. This was the widely publicized trial of John Scopes, a Tennessee high school teacher charged with teaching evolution against state law. The trial pitted Clarence Darrow, the noted agnostic lawyer, against William Jennings Bryan, the onetime Democratic presidential candidate and representative of Christian fundamentalism. Like the northern reporters who descended en masse on Dayton, Tennessee, to witness the trial, the Agrarians viewed it as an epochal conflict between religious traditionalism and scientific rationalism, only they were on the traditionalists' side. They began to write polemics on behalf of their region, which culminated in the publication of I'll Take My Stand (Ransom et al. [1930] ). This book, the Agrarians' manifesto, condemned the effect of industrialism on the economy, folkways, and racial hierarchy of the Old South.11
In this early work, the Agrarians replayed the conflict at the heart of the Scopes trial between scientific and traditional ways of understanding the world. Ransom's first book, published at the same time as I'll Take My Stand, was God without Thunder (1930), a philosophical defense of religious fundamentalism that exemplified his early, interdisciplinary approach. In it, he complained that the sciences and social sciences efface the full complexity of lived experience, what Ransom called the "world's body"; "when our thinking is scientific or conceptual, we fail to observe the particular objects as particulars, or as objects which are different, and contain a great many features not at all covered by the given concept. We attend only to what is constant or like among them, or to what has repetition-value" (59). This aesthetic failure, for Ransom, has consequences that are cultural, economic, and moral. Science leads directly to industrialism, which physically manifests the urge to reduce all phenomena to sameness. Culturally, industrialism effaces the differences between local regions, dissolving all folk cultures into a universal mass society that is everywhere the same. Economically, it treats nature as a resource to be exploited, robbing human beings of their ability to aesthetically appreciate the environment in which they live. Morally, it distorts the relations between human beings, leading them to treat each other as means to selfish ends. In this last regard, social science is particularly dangerous, since it tries to turn human beings into objects of research and control.
Ransom's solution was to defend traditions and conventions, which place limits on the rapacious energies and conceptual tyranny of industrialism and the sciences. His argument was based on an elaborate series of homologies between poetry, religion, social custom, and economics. Poetry, for instance, relies on conventional devices of meter, rhyme, and poetic style. These devices introduce linguistic texture into the poem-local variations of meaning that prevent the poem from ever making a direct statement of fact. Poetry, in other words, incorporates a kind of surface complexity that forces the reader to pay attention to the language itself and thus disrupts any illusion of linguistic transparency. However, this distancing enables a new, aesthetic appreciation of the lived experience that the poem gestures toward but can never comprehend; Ransom thus developed the paradox that in order to get closer to reality, we need poetic conventions that distance us from it. Social conventions work the same way. The ingrained traditions, rituals, and beliefs of a community place limits on social interaction and thus distance the citizen from a crude, materialist relationship to other people.12 Similarly with regard to economics, Ransom argued that agrarian communities are limited systems, which open men and women to a more complex, aesthetic appreciation of nature by restricting their relations with it. Ransom's nativist example, from "The Aesthetic of Regionalism" (1934 [Selected Essays 45-58] ), is a New Mexican Indian pueblo that the critic glimpsed through a train window on a journey across the United States. Observing the Indians' threshing with primitive tools, Ransom commented that it "'feels' right, it has aesthetic quality" (46). Once labor becomes conventional, it loses its character as mere work and becomes folk art, liberating the peasant's aesthetic faculties. Moreover, it lends to the society as a whole an aesthetic unity, derived from that society's adaptation to its local environment. The agrarian lifestyle, Ransom explained in the introduction to I'll Take My Stand, is "not an abstract system, but a culture, the whole way in which we live, act, think, and feel. It is a kind of imaginatively balanced life lived out in a definite social tradition" ("Statement" xliv).13 Ransom's Agrarianism thus culminates in a nostalgic and sociological vision of a perfectly integrated community.
The Agrarians, then, were distrustful of modern forms of techne, which were destructive of the ontologically richer knowledge embodied in poetry and traditional communities. The opposition they constructed was between the humanist intellectual as traditional craftsman, akin to Ransom's Pueblo Indians, and the technical intelligentsia as mass producer. This notion of humanist as craftsman was connected to their strong sense of regional identity; both the poet and the peasant experience lived particularity by subjecting themselves to their local customs and environment. Already in this early work, however, we can see inklings of the New Critical notion of academic professionalism, which entailed abandoning their early regionalism, reconciling themselves somewhat to modernity, and focusing on cultivating a pure or intrinsic theory of literary language. The Agrarians could not become like the Pueblo Indians from Ransom's nativist fantasy, working the land with crude implements. Embedded in the modern university, they were more like Ransom's narrator, watching the vanishing agrarian past through the windows of an industrial-era train, on his way to another conference. The proper site for critics was not the Old South but rather the modern academy, a shelter from industrial society in which they could recollect a lost cultural innocence.
This awareness was already implicit in "The Aesthetic of Regionalism," in which Ransom invoked an elaborate architectural analogy to explain the difference between industrialism and regionalism. Industrialism, Ransom argued, produces a debased form of architecture that reflects its effacement of regional particularities. Ransom's example is the state capitol at Baton Rouge. The building accurately represents the "power and opulence" of the state of Louisiana. However, when the state planned the building, it "took its bag and went shopping in the biggest market; it came back with New York artists, French and Italian marbles, African mahogany, Vesuvian lava for the paving." Regional motifs appear only "in some bas-reliefs and statues, and in the alligators, pelicans, magnolias, sugar canes, and cat-tails worked in bronze in the gates and door-panels" (57). In an industrial society, the regional environment no longer determines all aspects of local culture. Rather, the region becomes merely ornamental, etched onto a characterless economic market that is global in scope. Ransom's contrasting example of regional architecture perfectly adapted to its environment is the building in which he first read "The Aesthetic of Regionalism" as a lecture-one of the new buildings at Louisiana State University:
The old buildings still stand, or at least the "Barracks" do, in the heart of the city; the others had to go, since the city needed their room, and the University, with four thousand students, needed still more room and larger buildings. The old buildings are simple, genuine, and moving; precisely the sort of thing that would make a European town famous among the tourists. When the much larger plant of the new university was constructed it seems probable that buildings on the order of the Barracks but on the new scale would not have been economical, nor successful; therefore the builders conceived a harmonious plan for the campus in a modified Spanish, and it suits the regional landscape, and is not altogether foreign to the regional history.
Unlike the state capitol, the university successfully embodies its region; however, it does so by compromising with the industrial economy that devoured the old campus. The architects' new plan is not a rejection of the city's modernization. Rather, it is an attempt to complement it aesthetically, already an attenuation of Ransom's regionalist ideal. The architecture of Louisiana State University is no more indigenous to Baton Rouge than the state capitol's is. The buildings to which Ransom refers were designed by a Massachusetts firm in an Italian style in imitation of Stanford University.14 If they signify anything, it is not the local region but rather the history of the research university in the United States. This identification of regionalism with the university prefigured Ransom's abandonment of Agrarianism. Increasingly, in essays after "The Aesthetic of Regionalism," he imagined that the academy, rather than any particular region, is the critic's primary community. In a 1936 letter to Allen Tate, he confessed, "patriotism has nearly eaten me up, and I've got to get out of it." As an alternative to Agrarianism, Ransom proposed the development of an "American Academy of Letters," devoted to securing "an objective literary standard" in the United States (Selected Letters 217). This proposal was perhaps an allusion to Samuel Taylor Coleridge's solution to the British industrial revolution-the creation of a "Clerisy" or national church devoted to the cultivation of British culture (Coleridge 36) . The Academy of Letters would be a new cosmopolitan community, no longer rooted in region. Rather, it would be a community of diverse writers held together by their professional interest in literature. After listing about thirty qualified and almost qualified names (including his own and Tate's), Ransom explained, "[A] n Academy has got to be pretty catholic; a lot of them will necessarily be strange bedfellows. If too many alien persons seem to go into any nationalist list, our only alternative would be a Southern Academy" (Selected Letters 219). Ransom's academy thus seems like the literary equivalent of the state capitol in Baton Rouge-a hodgepodge of writers and critics ranging from Theodore Dreiser to Marianne Moore. Shortly after writing this letter, Ransom put his new eclecticism into practice. He abandoned his regional roots in Tennessee and moved to Kenyon College in Ohio. His primary accomplishment there, his editorship of the Kenyon Review, approximated his Academy of Letters. One of the reasons this journal was so influential was its inclusiveness; it published nonsouthern critics such as Lionel Trilling, Irving Howe, and Leslie Fiedler. As Ransom explained to Tate in a 1937 letter, his purpose in establishing the journal was to avoid partisan politics altogether; "it seems to me our cue would be to stick to literature entirely. There's no decent consistent group writing politics. . . . In the severe field of letters there's vocation enough for us: in criticism, in poetry, in fiction" (223).
This turn from the Old South to the cosmopolitan academy was the context for Ransom's effort to transform his theory of poetry and method of close reading into a new disciplinary paradigm, capable of imitating the rigor and consistency of the sciences and social sciences. "Criticism must become more scientific," he argued in his aptly titled "Criticism, Inc.," "or precise and systematic, and this means that it must be developed by the collective and sustained efforts of learned persons-which means that its proper seat is in the universities" (Selected Essays 94). Criticism will never become a very exact science, "but neither will psychology, if that term continues to refer to psychic rather than physical phenomena; nor will sociology . . ." (94). Ransom's basic conception of literature, at this point in the late 1930s, had not changed. Poetry still embodies an ontologically distinct type of knowledge, one that aims at recovering the particularity of lived experience; "We live in a world," he argued in "Wanted: An Ontological Critic" (1941 [Selected Essays 147-79] ), "that must be distinguished from the world, or the worlds, for there are many of them, which we treat in our scientific discourses. They are its reduced, emasculated, and docile versions. Poetry intends to recover the denser and more refractory original world which we know loosely through our perceptions and memories" (148). However, in his later work, he abandoned the notion that this original world can be recovered by nonprofessionals, such as his Pueblo Indians. Rather, the ontological experience of poetry can only be recovered by the professional critic, working within the academy. And it can only be recovered through the "scientific" technique of close reading, whose exactitude enables it to trace the "desperate ontological or metaphysical maneuver" (105) by which poetry evades the conceptual drive of scientific thought.
Ransom's animus against the sciences and industrialism also shifted. He became reconciled to the existence of an industrial economy and thus to the existence of the technical class; "without consenting to a division of labor," he argued in a 1945 essay that disavowed his former politics, "and hence modern society, we should have not only no effective science, invention, and scholarship, but nothing to speak of in art, e.g., reviews and contributions to reviews, fine poems and their exegesis." Poetry and criticism, he concluded, at best constitute "beautiful expiations" for the horrors of industrialism (Selected Essays 189). Instead, his diatribes against scientific rationality began to focus on threats internal to his discipline. Graff has reconstructed the debates into which the New Critics inserted themselves in the mid-1930s. In his account, the discipline at this time was divided between two groups-literary historians and generalist critics. The historians embodied the discipline's techne, which consisted of positivist research into biographical and textual facts. The generalists, among whom the New Critics once ranked, embodied its traditional moral concerns. Literary studies, in other words, replicated within itself the distinction between technical intelligentsia and humanist intellectuals. The accomplishment of the New Critics was to present both of these groups as insufficiently professional and to synthesize their competing claims; both the scholars and the critics neglect the aesthetic dimension proper to poetry itself. For Ransom, these disciplinary others replace the northern industrialists and carpetbaggers of his early essays; they threaten the identity of literary studies in the same way that industrialism, he once believed, threatened the South. They threaten to dissolve literary criticism's boundaries, fusing it into the other disciplines and especially the social sciences.15 Literary studies can preserve its distinctive disciplinary culture only if it embraces close reading as its new tradition or custom.
Indeed, in his later work, Ransom used much the same language to describe his new cosmopolitan, literary communities as he had earlier used in his Agrarian polemics. In a late essay, "The Communities of Letters" (1952 [Poems and Essays 109-17] ), written at the height of the New Criticism's influence in the academy, he imagined that works of art create alternative communities of critics within industrial society: "there comes into existence among readers, clustered of course round the presiding genius of the author, a community of a sort which could scarcely have been contemplated in the formal organization of society, a community of letters based on a common sympathy." Because there are many authors, there are also many reader-communities, each one akin to "one of those minority cultural groups which have their rights in a free society as surely as individuals do" (116-17). These communities parallel Ransom and other Agrarians' proposal in I'll Take My Stand that the South join together with other regional cultures and minority groups to combat industrialism. In Ransom's later work, however, the reader-communities are no longer opposed to industrial society. Rather, they together form another society within society: "if in some rude sense we add all the communities up, we will have, in theory at least, a total community having a peculiar role. It may be regarded as a secondary society, branching off from the formal or primary society, and easing its requirements, compelling its members to approach to the sense of a common humanity" (117). Ransom thus envisaged the academy as a republic of letters, bound together by the professional activities of a national clerisy consisting of himself and other critics and sheltering the society's common morality from the effects of industrialization.
Hence, Ransom's version of professionalism, like Parsons's, ends in a fantasy of the academic department as an ideal community. These two fantasies differ in their imagined effects on the technical intelligentsia. For Parsons, the academic department is a harbinger of a liberal revolution in industrial society, one that will transform society into a perfected form of the modern welfare state. Parsons's model is an evolutionary one; it requires students of the academy to leave it and transform business and government in the academy's image. In his university, students are trained to become wise and humane professionals ready to take over key positions in society at large. Ransom, in contrast, envisaged the "communities of letters" as retreats from industrial society; the professional critic escapes into the academy to keep aesthetic experience alive in a society hostile toward it. Put in other terms, both Parsons and Ransom imagined scholars as secular priests, but for Parsons, they are Jesuits, while for Ransom, they are cloistered monks. However, both fantasies involve similar mutations of socialtrustee professionalism. Both appropriate the social-trustee emphasis on technical expertise and its argument that the professional is the caretaker of public morality. But both undercut the essential assumption of the socialtrustee-the idea that disciplinary knowledge can or should be used to actively reform society in accordance with that morality. Instead, professionalism becomes reflexively oriented toward the self-perpetuation of the discipline itself, which becomes increasingly isolated from the other disciplines and from the public it is supposed to educate and reform.
The Crisis of the New Class
The disciplinary consensuses represented by Parsons's sociology and the New Criticism lasted to the mid-1960s, when the next generation of new class intellectuals rebelled against them in the name of a more politicized sociology and literary studies. These rebellions culminated in the American Studies Association and MLA conferences of 1968, which were each disrupted by a "Radical Caucus" of younger professors and graduate students with ties to the New Left. In many ways, these internal rebellions were efforts to revive and radicalize the moral function of professional work and reconnect with a broader public. As Louis Kampf and Paul Lauter argued in their introduction to The Politics of Literature (1972) , one of the texts that emerged from the 1968 MLA disruption, " [O] ur classroom objective is to make literature a vital part of students' lives, rather than an antiquarian or formal study or a means of forcing them into feelings of 'cultural deprivation'" (44). The effects of these revolutions on each discipline's politics and imagined relation to the new class cannot be overestimated. In the long term, however, literary critics and sociologists became increasingly skeptical about whether their disciplines did indeed play any useful role in United States society or whether they had merely replaced one set of disciplinary fantasies with another. By the 1990s, these doubts had generated an extensive literature in each field. Donald Levine, for instance, in Visions of the Sociological Tradition, describes a "reduction in public deference shown to the social science enterprise, following a period in the 1950s to early 1960s when virtually all branches of the U.S. federal governmentfrom the Supreme Court to Congress to many executive departments-made unprecedented use of social scientists in such areas as the fight against segregation, analysis of foreign elites, international economic development, and domestic antipoverty programs." The backlash against the social sciences, he continues, originated in the sense that their techniques had failed; "the demand for solutions to social problems far exceeded the capacity of the social sciences to deliver them. There grew a sense that the social sciences have not been and do not seem likely to produce the kinds of results their earlier proponents anticipated" (289).16 Literary critics similarly questioned the continued viability of their discipline in the face of the growing prominence of the technical intelligentsia. As Guillory argues in Cultural Capital, there has been a "large scale 'capital flight' in the domain of culture" away from the humanities (45). This capital flight has made the remaining political commitments of literary intellectuals seem increasingly unreal.
This sense of failure on the part of sociologists and literary critics should be contextualized in terms of the more general evolution of postwar American professionalism. In Brint's terms, social-trustee professionalism gave way in the second half of the twentieth century to a new ideology of "expert professionalism." This ideology emphasizes "intellectual training in the service of purposes determined by organizational authorities or market forces" (7), and it provides a much clearer justification for the technical professions than for the struggling humanities. Similarly, Barbara Ehrenreich describes a crisis of confidence on the part of the nontechnical professional stratum in the late 1960s. It manifested itself, she argues, in the discovery of the "silent majority" of the working class hitherto absent from professional discourse: "the commentators, professors, and Ivy League radicals awoke with a rude jolt to the idea that they were no longer the authentic voice of the American people but something more like a special-interest group, a minority, or, as some were eventually to decide, a 'new class' unto themselves" (98). For Brint and Ehrenreich, the moral claims that once accompanied professionalism have eroded, and both link this erosion to the gradual whittling away of the American welfare state. Within literature and sociology, however, this moral dimension of social-trustee professionalism was never robust to begin with. The process of professionalization divided the two disciplines into isolated fiefdoms, each of which deluded itself into believing that it embodied the interests of the entire new class.
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1. See esp. Liu; Newfield; Guillory, "The Sokal Hoax" and Cultural Capital; and Graff.
2. In 1996, the physicist Alan Sokal submitted a pseudoscientific essay entitled "Transgressing the Boundaries: Toward a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity" to the journal Social Text. On the day of the essay's publication, he revealed the hoax in Lingua Franca, initiating an extended debate about humanistic appropriations of scientific knowledge.
3. As Guillory notes, the division between sociology and literature stretches back to the mid-nineteenth century, when sociology first emerged as a discipline in France and England. In the United States, however, the boundaries between the two disciplines were more fluid until the mid-1930s. For more on the relation between sociology and literature in nineteenth-century Europe, see Lepenies. 4. Other examples of the convergence of literature and the social sciences in the 1930s include Zora Neale Hurston's association with Boasian anthropology, which produced hybrid literary-social scientific texts such as Mules and Men (1935) . In addition, the documentary trend of much 1930s literature exemplifies this convergence; James Agee and Walker Evans's Let Us Now Praise Famous Men (1941) is a particularly striking hybrid text.
5. Industrial sociology began with the Hawthorne experiments (designed to study the productivity of factory workers), which were conducted by Harvard re-searchers and extended from the late 1920s through to the mid-1930s. The management innovations that came from these experiments, however, only became common practice during and after World War II. For more on the emergence of industrial sociology, see Baritz. On the New Deal's use of social scientists, some statistics are available: according to Biderman and Crawford, the number of social scientists engaged in government work was about 680 in 1931. This figure rose to 2,150 over the next six years, as New Deal programs were implemented (41).
6. For an empirical account of the influence of structural functionalism in the 1950s and 1960s, see Lipset and Ladd. The authors cite a series of surveys of "the frequency with which various individuals are cited in the literature" of sociology, which showed that Parsons and his student, Merton, were the two most referenced figures. See also Huaco. Even in the 1950s, sociology was a diverse discipline; many quantitative sociologists remained untouched by Parsonian functionalism. In addition, popular sociologists associated with the New York Intellectuals, like David Riesman, Daniel Bell, and C. Wright Mills, did not rely on a Parsonian framework.
7. Mills's book initiated the backlash in sociology against Parsons's work, which culminated in Alvin Gouldner's The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology, essentially a book-length critique of Parsons.
8. For more on Parsons's emphasis on professionalism, see Brick.
9. See in particular Terry Eagleton's discussion of the New Critics in Literary Theory: "having begun life as a humanistic supplement or alternative to technocratic society, the movement thus found itself reproducing such technocracy in its own methods. The rebel merged into the image of his master, and as the 1940s and 1950s drew on was fairly quickly co-opted by the academic Establishment" (49). Eagleton also briefly draws a homology between the New Critical conception of poetry and the structural functionalist notion of the social system. As he puts it, "The literary text, for American New Criticism as for I. A. Richards, was therefore grasped in what may be called 'functionalist' terms: just as American functionalist sociology developed a 'conflict-free' model of society, in which every element 'adapted' to every other, so the poem abolished all friction, irregularity and contradiction in the symmetrical cooperation of its various features" (47).
10. Two excellent accounts of the Fugitives' evolution into Agrarians and subsequently New Critics are Stewart; and Young. The three groups do not overlap exactly. Brooks, for instance, was an Agrarian and New Critic but never a Fugitive. In contrast, Donald Davidson was a Fugitive and Agrarian but never a New Critic.
11. The Agrarians' attitude toward race relations was predictable for conservative southern intellectuals of their era. They nostalgically recollected the plantation economy of the Old South and in so doing elided the problem of slavery and race discrimination; "slavery," Ransom argued in one of his contributions to I'll Take My Stand, "was a feature monstrous enough in theory, but, more often than not, humane in practice" ("Reconstructed" 14) . Other contributors, such as Frank Lawrence Owsley ("The Irrepressible Conflict") and Robert Penn Warren ("The Briar Patch"), offered qualified defenses of the South's post-Civil War rejection of black suffrage.
12. Ransom developed this argument in "A Poem Nearly Anonymous" (1933), later reprinted as "Forms and Citizens" in The World's Body and Selected Essays (59-73).
13. The introduction is by Ransom alone, although it is not attributed to him in the text .
14. The buildings constructed in the 1920s and 1930s were initially designed by the noted landscape architect company Olmsted Brothers, who designed the campus layout for Stanford University in 1888. Another architect, Theodore Link, scrapped parts of their original plans to design Louisiana State's well-known quadrangle.
15. Cleanth Brooks also expressed this anxiety about disciplinary boundaries in The Well-Wrought Urn (1947) ; if the proponents of the humanities "are to be merely cultural historians, they must not be surprised if they are quietly relegated to a comparatively obscure corner of the history division. If one man's taste is really as good as another's, and they can pretend to offer nothing more than a neutral and objective commentary on tastes, they must expect to be treated as sociologists, though perhaps not as a very important kind of sociologist" (235).
16. For other accounts of the crisis in sociology, especially as related to the use of sociology in public policy, see the essays collected in Halliday and Janowitz.
